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This paper examines the effect of the global financial crisis on 
corporate investment in Korea. Specifically, the crisis was considered 
to have possibly constrained firm-level investment as the negative 
shock to the credit supply dramatically unfolded. As Duchin et al. 
(2010) demonstrated, if a negative supply-side shock is evident during 
a crisis period, larger cash holdings before the crisis will lead to fewer 
constraints to corporate investment, or vice versa. In order to 
investigate the supply-side effect of the crisis, we use firm-level 
financial data, including firms listed on the Korean stock market as 
well as small and medium-sized enterprises. We find that corporate 
investment declined significantly after the crisis, even if we control for 
factors associated with the demand side, such as contemporaneous 
capital productivity and cash flow. More importantly, the decline is 
positively and significantly related to cash holdings before the crisis, 
implying the negative effect of a credit supply shock. Small and 
medium enterprises experienced relatively sharp investment declines 
compared to those of larger firms, and the relationship between pre-
crisis cash amounts and the degree of investment decline is greater 
than that in large firms. Additionally, we examine whether the negative 
effect persists up to the present, finding evidence that the cash-
investment relationship continues in small and medium-sized 
enterprises. 
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I. Introduction 
 
oncerns about the negative effects of the credit supply shock emerged during 
the global financial crisis. Although a current account surplus in Korea had 
been maintained before the crisis, domestic banks experienced large capital inflows 
from 2005 to 2007, especially in short-term debt. As the negative effects of the 
global crisis were fully manifested, financial institutions whose headquarters were 
located in distressed economies stopped rolling over short-term loans to Korean 
banks. As a result, financial market in Korea experienced high volatility due to the 
sudden lack of capital inflows. The won/dollar exchange rate rose rapidly, reaching 
1,513 won in late November of 2008, up 38.9% from that August. CDS premiums 
also skyrocketed to 692bp, reflecting the increased credit risk to domestic banks. 
Stock prices lost roughly 50 percent of their value from the 2008 peak, market 
interest rates went up sharply, escalating the credit spread between corporate (AA-, 
three-year maturity) and government bonds (three-year maturity) to three times the 
level before the crisis. More importantly, domestic banks reduced their credit 
supply and became more conservative with regard to lending. 
Classical models of financial friction predict that a negative shock to external 
finance would restrict the real activities of economic agents. Consumers are 
expected to reduce their consumption of durable goods because the relative 
marginal value of durable goods to nondurable goods and services increases when 
facing constraints to liquidity. Firms will cut their investment expenditures because 
the cost of external fund increases, making the planned investment less profitable. 
Moreover, financial friction may increase during a crisis period when collateral 
loses its value (i.e., real estate prices drop). In such a case, the negative effects of 
the credit crunch are amplified and become more persistent. 
Our paper investigates the impact of the credit crunch during the global financial 
crisis on corporate investment. More specifically, we focus on cash reserves on 
firms’ balance sheets in order to identify the supply-side effects of the crisis, as in 
Duchin et al. (2010). Typically, if the external finance of a firm is constrained, its 
investment expenditure will be reduced on account of financial constraints. 
However, if the firm has enough cash reserves to accommodate the negative shock 
to external funding, its investment expenditures will be less affected by the 
negative shock. In essence, the more cash reserves a firm has, the lower its 
investment constraints (i.e., from a credit crunch) will be. We can use this idea to 
examine whether firms were negatively affected by the credit shortage during the 
crisis period. In particular, if the relationship between pre-crisis the cash reserve 
level and the degree of investment decline is significantly negative, we may 
conclude that a firm’s investments were negatively affected by the credit supply 
shortage during that period. 
Additionally, the magnitude of negative supply-side effects on corporate 
investment may differ depending on the degree of a firm’s financial constraints. In 
order to determine how much financial constraints matter, our study adds unlisted 
firms to the analysis. This is relatively unexplored in the literature, and doing this 
will highlight the differential negative supply effects on investments between large 
firms and small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Because a firm’s financial 
C
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constraints may also depend on factors other than its size, we also use the factors of 
industry (three-digit) sales growth and ownership to identify financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms. In addition, we investigate whether the 
shrinkage of the credit supply during the crisis had persistent negative effects on 
corporate investment. If the negative shock of external funds persistently affected 
corporate investment, we would observe that the relationship between pre-crisis 
cash levels and the investment decline is significant not only for the immediate 
year after the crisis but also for all years since the crisis in the sample. 
Our results show that the estimated average investment decline after the global 
financial crisis is 1.3%p (in terms of investments to the total asset ratio) for the 
firms in our sample. This decline is significant even if we control for investment 
demand, implying that the contraction in investment expenditure cannot be 
explained by the reduced investment opportunity after the crisis. More importantly, 
we find evidence that the investment decline is caused by the negative supply-side 
shock (or the credit supply shortage). Specifically, as a firm has more cash reserves 
before the crisis, its investment decline is significantly less. When we divide our 
estimation sample into two groups, i.e., firms which are more financially 
constrained and those which are less financially constrained, we find that the 
negative shock to the credit supply has in general a greater effect on financially 
constrained firms. For instance, the investment decline caused by the supply-side 
effect is more evident for SMEs. Other criteria pertaining to financial constraints, 
such as industry sales growth and ownership, also provide results which are 
qualitatively identical to those determined by the classification of financial 
constraints based on firm size. We also find evidence that the persistent investment 
contraction in SMEs after the crisis is related to the negative shock to the credit 
supply. 
Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce related 
studies, especially those on the real effects of the financial crisis. In Section 3, we 
briefly review the financial market in Korea during the global financial crisis and 
provide a preliminary analysis of the relationship between firms’ pre-crisis cash 
levels and the degrees of the decline in corporate investment. In Section 4, we 
discuss the manner in which we construct our estimation sample from firms’ 
financial data, the baseline hypothesis in which we are interested, and the empirical 
strategy that we use in order to address the endogeneity issue and secure robustness. 
We then move on to present the main results, which will shed light on the negative 
effects of the credit crunch. In the final section, we summarize our findings and 
describe their implications. 
 
II. Related Literature 
 
Since the global financial crisis of 2008, studies on the real effects of the 
financial crisis, specifically in developed economies, have been active. Many 
attempt to quantify the magnitude of the negative effects of the crisis based on the 
transmission mechanism through which financial contraction affects the real 
economy. In this section, we discuss the findings of related studies on the financial 
22 KDI Journal of Economic Policy  FEBRUARY 2015 
 
crisis and introduce a number of empirical works which quantify the negative 
effects of the global financial crisis. 
Classical theory assumes the existence of financial friction1 when analyzing the 
relationships between real and financial variables. According to studies related to 
classical theory, financial friction would not only amplify the response of real 
activities to negative shocks, but also make it persistent.2 For instance, a financial 
crisis involves a large negative shock of the external funding to debtors, in what is 
termed a credit crunch, as well as a sharp depreciation of asset prices. As a result, 
the fall in asset prices damages the debtor’s net worth (or the collateral value), 
which makes it more difficult for the debtor to procure additional outside funds. 
This is the so-called ‘vicious cycle’, which produces an amplification mechanism 
which acts on the financial friction. Moreover, in the event the debtor was highly 
leveraged before the crisis, this amplification mechanism makes it more difficult 
for them to recover their financial soundness, allowing observations of a prolonged 
economic contraction after the crisis. 
With regard to credit supply during the global financial crisis, Ivashina and 
Scharfstein (2010) report that during the fourth quarter of 2008, when the 
uncertainty from the financial crisis started to unfold, new loans by commercial 
banks fell by 47% relative to the prior quarter and by 79% relative to the peak of 
the credit boom (the second quarter of 2007). According to their analysis, banks’ 
over dependence on short-term financial market leads to a large drop in the credit 
supply during the crisis period. Meanwhile, they also show that even if the total 
assets of the banking sector in the U.S. grew by 100 billion dollars from September 
to mid-October of 2008, it was a result of credit line drawdowns and not the 
creation of new loans. 
Related to the real effect of the credit shortage during the global crisis, Campello 
et al. (2010) find that financially constrained firms cut employment and capital 
expenditure more compared to unconstrained firms. Based on a survey of chief 
financial officers (CFOs) in the U.S., Europe, and Asia, they studied whether firms’ 
economic activity levels differ conditional on their degree of financial constraint. 
They find that the average constrained firm in the U.S. reduced employment by  
11% and capital expenditures by 9%, while unconstrained firms’ spending cuts 
were insignificant. Moreover, they report that constrained firms burned through 
approximately 20% of their pre-crisis cash, drew more from their credit lines for 
fear that banks would restrict access in the future, and sold more assets to fund 
their activities. 
Meanwhile, Duchin et al. (2010) find that the corporate investment decline in the 
U.S. was significant and that the decline was more severe for firms with fewer cash 
reserves or more short-term debt. In addition, they investigate whether the credit 
crunch has had persistent effects on corporate investment, finding that the negative 
supply-side effect seems to have disappeared one year after the crisis. In fact, their 
result shows that the demand-side effect, e.g., decreased investment opportunities, 
                                          
1Financial friction essentially refers to the cost of financial transactions; it can originate from information 
asymmetry or from moral hazard. For traditional models of financial friction, refer to Jaffee and Russell (1976), 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), among others. 
2Brunnermeier et al. (2012) provides an excellent survey of the role of financial friction in business cycle 
theory. 
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mainly explains the sluggish investment after the crisis. 
We also find qualitatively similar results in earlier studies.3 For instance, Arslan 
et al. (2006) find that cash reserves in Turkish firms served as a form of self-
insurance during the crisis period, as firms there with enough cash could cope with 
the negative shock to external finance and ultimately maintain their planned 
investment projects. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) studied banking crises cases across 
countries and showed that industries with higher dependence on external funding 
experienced slower recovery rates and delayed growth. 
Recent studies of the impact of the global financial crisis on the Korean 
economy focus on the adequacy of the capital of banks or cash holdings of the 
corporate sector, as these variables can serve to buffer the negative shock from the 
crisis. Hahm and Kim (2011) find that the soundness of financial institutions in 
emerging economies can perform as a shock absorber as well. They concluded that 
greater soundness of a financial institution meant a shorter spell of a crisis and a 
smaller negative impact as well. Kim (2011) also finds that the economic downturn 
of Korea accompanying the 2008 crisis was much smaller than that of the 1997 
currency crisis and that the recovery was also faster after the recent crisis. 
According to his assessment, the corporate sector has made significant 
improvement in restoring their financial soundness and managing the risks from 
assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currencies after the 1998 crisis, 
leading to relatively low amounts of damage from the more recent crisis. 
In this paper, we focus on the roles of financial buffers in mitigating negative 
external shocks to corporate investment. While previous studies of the 2008 crisis 
mainly examine the impact of foreign financial shocks, we contrast the impact of 
the negative shock to the demand side with the negative shock to the credit supply 
by incorporating variables which reflect investment demand. Additionally, we 
investigate a sample which was relatively unexplored in previous studies by 
including small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to determine whether the negative 
supply-side effect stands out in our sample. Because the funding structure of large 
firms differs from that of SMEs, the negative shock from external finance would 
also have a different impact. If this is the case, we would observe a different real 
impact of the crisis depending upon the firm size.  
Finally, our work is also related to studies of domestic firms’ cash holdings. 
From the negative view4 on firms’ cash holdings, large cash holdings of corporate 
sector are interpreted as poor corporate governance or as misallocations of 
resources. On the other hand, Lim and Choi (2006) find evidence that the cash 
holdings of firms can be considered as precautionary savings5 in response to 
operational uncertainty. Lee (2005) also finds in his work on publicly traded firms 
that higher sales uncertainty can lead to more cash holdings. Our view on these 
cash reserves is in line with the above studies, indicating a positive role of this cash, 
                                          
3Refer to Fazzari et al. (1988), Hoshi et al. (1991) and Kaplan and Zingles (1997) among others, for more 
traditional studies on the negative effect of credit shrink to financially constrained firms. 
4Classical literature on excess cash holdings by firms report that poor governance can create management 
incentives to accumulate cash assets, leading to misappropriations and excessive cash holdings (see, e.g., Dittmar 
et al. (2007), Harford et al. (2008) and Pinkowitz et al. (2006)). 
5Regarding the precautionary saving motive by firms, refer to Opler et al. (1999), Almeida et al. (2004), and 
Bates et al. (2009), among others. 
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i.e., if firms hold enough cash reserves, they can mitigate negative shocks to the 
supply side. 
III. The Relationship between Pre-Crisis Cash Reserves 
and Investment Decline:  
An Episode of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis 
 
A. A Foreign Liquidity Crisis May Lead to a Credit Crunch 
  
The global financial crisis can be symbolized as a global event which was 
accompanied by a world-wide credit shock. The crisis emerged from the massive 
defaults of U.S. subprime mortgages, and eventually unfolded to full scale in 
September of 2008, when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. Subprime 
mortgages, which were real-estate-backed loans to households with relatively poor 
credit ratings, had been growing at a fast pace due to the prolonged accommodative 
monetary policy and the appreciation of house prices. Newly underwritten 
subprime mortgage loans accounted for nearly 8.6% of all mortgage lending in 
2001, but they increased rapidly to 20.1% by 2006. However, after the middle of 
2006, mortgage interest rates increased as the Federal Reserve increased rates, 
driving up the delinquency rate of subprime mortgage borrowers. As a result, the 
prices of financial derivatives related to the subprime loans, such as mortgage-
backed securities (or MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (or CDOs) fell 
drastically. Financial institutions which had considerable exposure to these assets 
experienced massive losses, and the credit worthiness of Monoline, a U.S. CDO 
guarantor, was seriously downgraded. In March of 2008, the U.S. investment bank 
Bear Sterns declared bankruptcy, and the government sponsored entities Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, which reinforced the credit of mortgage-backed securities, 
saw their stock prices plunge. Eventually, in September of 2008, Lehman Brothers, 
one of the largest investment banks in the U.S., filed for bankruptcy protection.  
The Lehman bankruptcy alerted against counterparty risk, and the preference for 
risky assets evaporated quickly. Many financial institutions had difficulty securing 
liquidity, and the liquidity problem quickly spread from one institution to the others. 
Banks in emerging economies, which usually serve as intermediaries for funds 
from banks in developed countries to domestic firms and consumers, were at this 
point in peril because they borrowed short-term foreign currency while lending in 
long-term domestic currency. As a result, many emerging-market banks 
experienced their own foreign liquidity crises when their counterparties in 
developing countries stopped lending (or rolling over the loans). Korean banks 
were not an exception to this turmoil. 
In the Korean domestic financial market, the volatility in exchange rates, stock 
prices and interest rates increased sharply (see Figure 1). As foreign bank branches 
stopped supplying short-term foreign currency loans (or rolling over these loans), 
domestic banks faced extreme foreign liquidity problems. As their demand for 
foreign liquidity skyrocketed, banks took large long positions in the FX spot 
market. As a result, won/dollar exchange rate soared. The exchange rate started to 
rise at a steep pace in September of 2008, reaching 1,513 won in November of 
2008, thus marking a rise of nearly 38.9% in only two months. During this process, 
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a vicious cycle emerged: as spot prices increased, the banks’ ability to repay the 
foreign-currency-denominated debt weakened and the creditworthiness of domestic 
banks was hampered, making the foreign banks even more hesitant to supply 
 
FIGURE 1. KOREA STOCK PRICE INDEX (KOSPI) AND THE WON/DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE 
 
Source: Bank of Korea 
 
foreign currency loans to domestic banks. This caused the domestic bank’s demand 
for foreign currency to increase even more. Although the Korean economy had 
maintained a current account surplus before the crisis, many factors pushed the 
exchange rate surprisingly upwardly. Together with the foreign liquidity problem of 
domestic banks, we also observed a large counterparty risk premium to emerging 
countries and a sudden draw of short-term portfolio capital as one of the driving 
forces behind the exploding exchange rates. Meanwhile, the KOSPI index was at 
938.75p in October of 2008, the lowest level of the year and marking a 50.3% 
decline compared to the highest level of 1,888.88p in May of 2008. Market interest 
rates also showed steep increases before the effect of the policy rate cut by the 
Bank of Korea was reflected. For instance, the corporate bond rate (AA-, three-
year maturity) soared from 6.64% in January of 2008 to 8.56% in November of 
2008. 
With regard to the impact of the global financial crisis on the real economy in 
Korea, we also observe that no major bankruptcy in the business sector was 
reported and that overall economic activity recovered in a relatively short period of 
time. However, this does not imply that the Korean economy did not suffer any 
negative influence of the liquidity shock. In fact, the following argument indicates 
that the credit crunch for financially constrained firms was real and affected them 
negatively. First, the foreign liquidity problem experienced by banks during the 
crisis contributed to the decrease in the credit supply to the business sector. As 
domestic banks found it more difficult to finance foreign currency, they sought 
alternative measure, such as selling their local currency assets and buying foreign 
currency on the spot market. As a result, households or firms found it more difficult 
to obtain new loans or were forced to repay their debts. Such a collapse of stock 
prices or asset prices can also affect the supply of credit negatively. The U.S. case 
can provide us valuable insight into this argument; as asset prices there 
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significantly declined, bank balance sheets worsened due to losses from their 
exposure to the troubled assets, which triggered a massive retrieval of their 
exposure (or sales of assets) in an effort to maintain their capital requirements. In 
this process, the reduction of banks’ assets resulted in a decreased credit supply. 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the results of a survey of loan officers and the net 
change in outstanding loans by banks, respectively. The net percentage of domestic 
banks tightening standards for industrial and household loans grew rapidly after 
mid-2008 (see Figure 2), and banks appeared to reduce their new lending during 
2008, especially to SMEs (see Figure 3). This may reflect the domestic banks’ 
weakening balance sheets and their efforts to recover their capital. Firms can also 
experience a negative shock to their net worth due to asset price declines and 
sluggish demand during crises periods. As their net worth begins to contract, their 
creditworthiness is also aggravated such that financial institutions will hesitate to 
supply loans which otherwise are available to firms. 
 
 
FIGURE 2. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS’ ATTITUDES TOWARD LENDING 
 
Notes: A positive (+) lending attitude means that there are more financial institutions with an ‘easing’ attitude to 
lending than those with a ‘tightening’ attitude. 
Source: Bank of Korea 
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FIGURE 3. CHANGES IN OUTSTANDING LOANS BY BANKS 
 
Source: Bank of Korea 
In sum, domestic banks in Korea were affected by the sudden halt in short-term 
debt (or the stoppage of roll-overs) during the 2008 crisis, and the magnitude of the 
foreign liquidity problem does not appear to be less than that of the 1997 crisis. 
While the Korean economy rode out the crisis relatively well and showed a rapid 
recovery after the crisis in an ex-post sense, it is hard to say that firms were 
quarantined from the negative shock to the credit supply during the crisis period. 
From this perspective, we investigate whether the shock to the credit supply 
affected economic activity, especially firm investments during the crisis period. In 
the following subsection, we examine the relationship between pre-crisis cash 
reserves and corporate investment declines in a simple analysis of negative supply-
side effects. 
 
B. Corporate Investment during the Crisis and Pre-crisis Cash Reserves 
 
In order to examine the relationship between pre-crisis cash and the corporate 
investment decline, we categorize our sample firms6 into three groups based on 
cash reserves (cash/total assets) as measured one year before the crisis year of 2008 
and define low- and high-cash firms as the first and the third terciles, respectively. 
For both the low- and high-cash firms, we compare the sample means of corporate 
investment (capital expenditure/total assets) before and after the crisis and attempt 
to check whether high-cash firms show relatively low investment declines. Table 1 
shows the differences in investments from 2007 to 2008 for both high- and low-
cash firms. Before the crisis, the investment expenditure of an average firm 
matched 9.28% of its total assets, showing a decline by 0.99%p (10.6% relative to 
the pre-crisis investment level) to 8.29%, with the decline statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Meanwhile, when we compare the investment declines of low- and 
high-cash firms, the decline for low-cash firms was found to be 2.43%p, whereas it 
is only 0.20%p for high-cash firms, indicating that low-cash firms reduced their 
                                          
6For more details on the construction of our sample, refer to Section 4.1. 
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investments more than high-cash firms. 
 
TABLE 1—CASH RESERVES AND POST-CRISIS INVESTMENTS: LARGE FIRMS AND SMES 
  Pre-crisis Cash Pre-crisis Inv. Post-crisis Inv. Inv. decline P-value 
  (A) (B) (B-A) 
Overall Low 10.291  7.857  -2.435  0.000  
High  7.760  7.968  0.208  0.836  
All  9.287  8.295  -0.992  0.000  
Large firms Low  7.766  5.838  -1.928  0.000  
High  5.480  5.881  0.401  0.831  
All  6.603  6.055  -0.548  0.026  
SMEs Low 10.614  8.112  -2.502  0.000  
High  8.208  8.398  0.189  0.787  
All  9.640  8.592  -1.048  0.000  
Notes: 1) ‘Low’ and ‘High’ correspond to the first and third terciles, respectively. 2) The classifications of small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) and large firms are based on KIS data. 3) The p-value is for the null hypothesis of 
an investment decline (B-A < 0). 
 
Because SMEs are financially more constrained (or more exposed to the 
information asymmetry problem), one can expect that small firms experience 
greater investment declines even after controlling for pre-crisis cash reserves. In 
order to take into account the difference in financing constraints between large 
firms and SMEs, we divide the sample into two groups, e.g., large firms and SMEs, 
and perform the same analysis. For large firms, investments by low-cash firms drop 
by 1.92%p, while those of high-cash firms actually increase by 0.40%p. We find a 
similar relationship between cash and investment declines for SMEs, though the 
relationship between pre-crisis cash and the investment decline appears to be 
somewhat stronger than it is for large firms. 
Figure 4 shows a scatterplot of the average pre-crisis cash reserves and the 
differences in investments for the 100th percentile cash group of large firms and 
SMEs. We confirmed that the negative relationship between pre-crisis cash and 
investment decline is greater for SMEs. Table 2 reports a simple regression result,  
 
 
(A) Large firms (B) SMEs 
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FIGURE 4. PRE-CRISIS CASH AND CORPORATE INVESTMENT DECLINES 
 
Source: KIS data, author’s calculations 
 
TABLE 2—SIMPLE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR CORPORATE INVESTMENT DECLINES 
  Overall Large firms SMEs 
      
Cash 0.0947*** 0.0487*** 0.101*** 
(0.00758) (0.0150) (0.00945) 
Constant -2.410*** -1.350*** -2.507*** 
(0.130) (0.284) (0.160) 
N. Obs. 100  100 100 
R-squared 0.615  0.097 0.538 
Notes: 1) This result is based on a simple regression of the difference in corporate investments with regard to pre-
crisis cash reserves. Cash reserves are the 100th percentiles of ‘cash and cash equivalents’ for fiscal year 2007, and 
the differences in investments are calculated for the corresponding percentile group from fiscal years 2007 to 2008. 
2) The classifications of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and large firms are based on KIS data. 3) Numbers 
in parenthesis are the standard errors from the ordinary least squares. 4) ***, **, or * indicate that the coefficient 
estimate is significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
showing the difference in corporate investments as the dependent variable and pre-
crisis cash reserve as the independent variable. The estimated coefficients of cash 
for the pooled sample, for large firms, and for SMEs are all positive and 
statistically significant. However, the coefficient for the SMEs is more than two 
times greater than that of the large firms. For instance, SMEs with an additional 
10%p of cash showed reduced investment drops by 1.01%p, while for large firms 
with 10%p more cash, this value was 0.48%p. 
Overall, we find that firms with low amounts of cash before the crisis suffered 
more; their investment decline was greater than those of high-cash firms. Second, 
cash was more valuable to SMEs; their cash reserves played a greater role as an 
internal buffer in mitigating the negative shock to external finances as compared to 
those of large firms. 
We will consider demand-side variables into our model, where unobservable 
firm-specific time-invariant effects are also considered. 
 
IV. Empirical Analysis 
 
A. Data 
 
We use firm-level panel data on financial statements to construct our sample. 
The sample is extracted from the KIS VALUE database of the National Information 
& Credit Evaluation. In order to investigate corporate investments before and after 
the 2008 crisis, we use annual7 data for firms with the fiscal year closing at the end 
of December. 
We pay strong attention to corporate investment expenditures between fiscal 
years 2007 and 2008, presuming that the crisis was mainly a financial phenomenon, 
which is usually short-lived. Hence, we exclude data from 2009 from our main 
                                          
7Because we include not only publicly traded firms but also SMEs in our sample, many observations are not 
available at quarterly frequencies. 
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sample.8 Because there may be concern over sample selection bias, we check 
whether the main results from our sample are robust. We find that our empirical 
findings stand still after adding two or three years of data to the pre- and post-crisis 
sample and after changing the dating of the crisis from 2008 to 2009. Our sample 
includes not only publicly traded firms (listed on either the KOSPI or KOSDAQ 
markets) but also firms with external audit requirements and general firms9 (see 
Table 3). The broad coverage of our dataset is helpful for examining whether SMEs 
were more vulnerable to the liquidity shock during the crisis. Typically, publically 
traded firms, which already meet stock market listing requirements such as years in 
operation, business size and performance level, are less exposed to the information 
asymmetry problem. Thus, they appear to be less financially constrained. However, 
small firms (or young firms) are more financially constrained such that their 
investment decline due to the credit supply shock is expected to be greater. 
TABLE 3—COMPOSITION OF FIRMS IN THE SAMPLE 
    N. Obs. (%) N. Firms (%) 
KOSPI Listed   1,020    4.80   559  4.43  
Issues for admin.     17    0.08    17  0.13  
KOSDAQ Listed   1,283    6.04   777  6.16  
Registered   1,611    7.59   930  7.37  
Issues for admin.    102    0.48    95  0.75  
External audit requirement 14,808   69.75  9,236  73.22  
General firm  2,362   11.13  2,016  15.98  
Govt. owned corporations and others     26    0.12     20  0.16  
Total 21,229  100.00  13,650  108.21  
Notes: 1) The table shows the composition of the sample after excluding outliers and those with missing values. 2) 
‘KOSDAQ registered’ refers to the status in which a firm meets certain requirements of the Securities and 
Exchange Act while its stock is not yet traded in the market. 3) ‘Issues for administration’ refers to firms which 
may face a delisting from the stock market. 4) Firms can be counted twice if they changed their status regarding a 
stock market listing, e.g., the initial public offering of an external audit firm. For reference, the total number of 
firms in our sample is 12,614. 
 
By dividing our sample into large firms and SMEs, we can compare the negative 
supply-side effect on investment expenditures for the two different groups and find 
implications pertaining to the relationship between corporate investment decline 
and financial constraint. 
With regard to the SME sample, the following issues should be noted. First, we 
should consider a new proxy reflecting investment demand by individual firms, as 
the market value of non-public firms (and Tobin’s q) is unobservable in practice. In 
this study, we use the sales-to-capital ratio 10  as a proxy for the marginal 
                                          
8One may suggest using a different time span, e.g., from 2008 to 2009; however we see limitations on the use 
of this time span, as the negative shock to external finance may disappear quickly and may be more difficult to 
capture, as the government started to inject massive liquidity into the market via the emergency liquidity supply 
program. 
9Here, general firms refer to corporations which do not meet the external audit criteria. 
10Conceptually, Tobin’s q is a theoretical value which is determined by summing all of the streams of present 
and future expected marginal productivity of capitalbased on information from management (Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg (1998)). Strictly speaking, one needs a theoretic model (or assumptions) on how management 
calculates marginal productivity and takes expectation to find the value of Tobin’s q for individual firms. In our 
work, we calculate the marginal productivity of capital based on the assumption of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function, finding the expected value by presuming that productivity is dictated by an autoregressive Markov 
process. 
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productivity of capital instead of Tobin’s q. Second, as Lim (2005) noted, we find 
that the financial statements of firms with external audit requirements or those of 
general corporations has many missing values about detailed items, compared to 
those of publicly traded firms, indicating that the credibility and usefulness of the 
included SME samples are relatively low.11 
We measure corporate investment as cash outflows for items of purchase of 
tangible, intangible and leased asset on cash flow statements.12 Our measurement 
of corporate investment has the following features. First, as Lim (2005) noted, our 
measure is free from distortions such as depreciation and asset revaluations 
compared to the alternative investment measure of the difference in tangible assets. 
Because the increase in tangible assets reflects investment expenditures as well as 
the difference in accumulated depreciation, it may undervalue a firm’s investments. 
With regard to asset revaluations, tangible assets can increase even if there were no 
investment expenditures; in such a case, the alternative measure can overvalue 
corporate investments. 
Second, our measure of corporate investment includes not only expenditures for 
property, plants, and equipment, which are typically termed ‘capital expenditures’, 
but also expenditures on land, buildings, and intangible assets (e.g., R&D 
expenditures). Hence, corporate investment in this paper is more comprehensive 
than capital expenditures. Practically, it is not very attractive or feasible to calculate 
capital expenditures in our case, as there are many missing values pertaining to 
expenditures for land, buildings, and intangible assets in our sample of SMEs. 
Third, investment expenditures in our study did not adjust for an increase in cash 
due to asset sales, though Lim (2005) measures corporate investment as net cash 
outflows (cash outflows minus cash inflows) in items of purchases of tangible 
assets (excluding land and buildings). Because one of the objectives in his work 
was to compare corporate equipment investments as calculated from firm-level 
data with those from aggregate data, it appears to be reasonable to use the net cash 
decrease as equipment investments. However, our goal is to examine whether firms 
decrease investment expenditures in response to a negative credit supply shock. In 
this case, it is natural to focus on cash outflows.13 
With regard to data purging, we exclude financial firms and utilities, defined as 
firms with Korea Standard Industry Classification (KSIC) codes 35-36 and 64-66 
in the two-digit category. The financial statements of financial firms have different 
items and accounting standards; moreover, their investment expenditures (e.g., an 
increase in private loan) are not directly connected to real activities, which among 
the main variables of interest. Meanwhile, most utilities are accounted for in large 
public firms, where investment expenditures are related more to the government’s 
plan to supply electricity, gas, water, and other such utilities, indicating that the 
                                          
11The number of publicly traded firms in our sample is 1,336; firms with external audit requirements number 
9,236, and general corporations stand at 2,016, whereas there were a total of 1,567 publicly traded firms, 14,594 
firms with external audit requirements, and 91,454 general corporations in the original KIS database. For more 
details on the composition of firms in our sample, refer to Table 4-1. 
12All variables used in our study were calculated from stand-alone financial statements. 
13Alternatively, when we calculate corporate investments based on net cash outflows, we find qualitatively 
similar results, although the data coverage is reduced as the values on cash inflow from the sales of assets are 
largely missing or small. 
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exclusion of these firms provides more accuracy in our empirical analysis. We also 
handle outliers in investments, cash reserves,14 and sales-to-fixed capital ratios by 
excluding extremely large or small firm-year observations15 compared to the 
empirical distribution of those variables in the largest sample from 1993 to 2011.16 
For instance, we exclude observations with investments greater than the 99th 
percentile or smaller than the 1st percentile in all observations. Before calculating 
the percentile values, we exclude observations with variables which are nearly or 
precisely have a zero bound.17 
Table 4 shows the summary statistics for of corporate investment, pre-crisis cash 
reserves, capital productivity, and cash flow amounts for the constructed sample. 
Except for the cash reserves, all of the variables are for the firm-year observations 
from 2007 to 2008. Large firms’ investment expenditures amount to is 6.33% of over 
total assets, which is less smaller than the value of 9.12% of SMEs’ investments. 
TABLE 4—SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Mean Std. N. Obs. 
Investment Large firms  6.33   7.01   2,477  
 (%) SMEs  9.12   9.86  18,752  
All  8.79   9.62  21,229  
Cash Large firms 12.75  13.53   1,136  
 (%) SMEs 11.37  12.64   7,397  
All 11.55  12.77   8,533  
Capital productivity Large firms  9.33  15.29   2,477  
(%) SMEs  8.09  13.50  18,752  
All  8.23  13.72  21,229  
Cash flow Large firms  9.71  11.52   2,477  
(%) SMEs  8.57  13.35  18,752  
All  8.71  13.15  21,229  
Notes: 1) ‘Investment’ denotes cash outflows due to the purchase of tangible, intangible and leased assets to the 
total assets ratio, ‘Cash’ is cash and cash equivalents over total assets during fiscal year 2004, ‘Capital productivity’ 
is the ratio of sales to tangible and intangible assets, and ‘Cash flow’ denotes operating income before depreciation 
and amortization over total assets. 2) The classifications of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and large firms 
are based on KIS data. 
 
The average cash position of large firms is 12.75% of total assets, while that of 
SMEs was found to be 11.37%. Capital productivity, which is measured in terms of 
sales over tangible and intangible assets, is also shown to be greater in large firms. 
The average capital productivity of large firms is 9.33%, while that of SMEs is 
8.09%. The average yearly cash flows are 9.71% and 8.53% (of total assets) for 
large firms and SMEs, respectively. 
 
B. Methodology 
 
                                          
14Cash reserve is defined as cash and cash equivalents in balance sheet. 
15Due to the exclusion of firm-year observations, our panel is unbalanced. 
16Due to the reported lag of financial statements, we only observe a small number of firms for fiscal year 2012; 
therefore, we did not use the observations made in 2012. 
17This arises because the raw distribution of our main variables is too skewed towards zero to find reasonable 
cut-off values for handling outliers. Though we arbitrarily exclude observations which have values which are very 
close or equal to zero, this clearly contributes to reducing unnecessary miscalculations from handling and 
comparing extremely small values. 
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Mainly, we follow the empirical strategy in Duchin et al. (2010). One of the key 
identifying assumptions in their approach is that the significantly positive 
relationship between the corporate investment decline and pre-crisis cash reserves 
will reflect the negative supply-side effect during the crisis period. Before digging 
further into the details, we introduce the main features of their method here. The 
specifications of Duchin et al. (2010) are designed to test whether the decline in the 
credit supply during the financial crisis had a negative effect on corporate 
investments. Intuitively, the method is similar to the difference in differences 
method, in which mainly the treatment effect of pre-crisis cash reserves is 
examined. If the negative supply-side effect actually matters, the larger a firm’s 
cash holdings are, the smaller the constraint to investment would be, as cash 
holdings prior to a crisis can serve as an alternative funding source for investments. 
Hence, the regression model of investments by firms will exhibit a significantly 
positive coefficient of the interaction term between the crisis dummy and pre-crisis 
cash reserves, as far as the null hypothesis of the supply-side effect is evident. 
Meanwhile, it appears to be necessary to include variables which reflect 
investment demand by firms, as corporate investment expenditures can also be 
affected individual firms’ investment opportunities. After including variables 
regarding the investment opportunities of each firm, we can decompose how much 
of the investment decline is affected by financial and fundamental factors while 
also check the robustness of the results with regard to the specification for 
investment demand. The significantly positive relationship between investment and 
cash reserves will only be observed in firms which experienced a negative external 
funding shock due to the decline in the credit supply or a loss of their net worth 
during the crisis period. Also, if corporate investment declines are mainly driven by 
demand-side effects, then the significantly positive relationship will disappear after 
including variables pertaining to investment opportunities. The baseline model of 
Duchin et al. (2010) can be described as follows: 
 
(1)  y௜,௧ = ܿ + ߙܦ௧ + ߚܦ௧ܥܽݏℎ௜,ఛ + ߛ′ ௜ܺ,௧ + ߭௜ + ߝ௜,௧, 
 
Here, the subscripts i, t and τ are the firm, the year, and a fixed pre-crisis year, 
y௜,௧  denotes investment expenditure over total assets, D௧  is a crisis dummy, 
Cash௜,ఛ denotes pre-crisis cash reserves over total assets, X௜,௧ represents variables 
which reflect investment opportunities, and ν௜  indicates unobservable firm-
specific fixed effects. 
Though the methodology is simple and straightforward, the use of pre-crisis cash 
reserves in identifying supply-side effects requires much caution due to 
endogeneity and identification problem. Following Duchin et al. (2010), we 
provide a rationale for our selection of this instrument by comparing the estimation 
results. We also conduct various robustness checks of our baseline results. 
Specifically, the empirical strategy used here is as described below. 
First, in order to address the possible endogeneity issue, we include lagged cash 
reserves of individual firms in our baseline specification. Our baseline specification 
can be expressed as follows: 
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(2)       y௜,௧ = ܿ + ߙܦ௧ + ߚ଴ܦ௧ܥܽݏℎ௜,ఛ + ∑ ߚ௞ܥܽݏℎ௜,௧ି௞௄௞ୀଵ + ߛ′ ௜ܺ,௧ + ߭௜ + ߝ௜,௧. 
 
Lagged cash balances of firms are known to be related to their investment activities; 
therefore, this may impose the endogeneity problem (a non-zero correlation 
between cash reserves and unexplained investment demands) on pre-crisis cash 
should it be missing. For example, firms which expect greater investment 
opportunities in the future may retain more profits to increase corporate savings. In 
such a case, the investment at time t will be correlated with cash reserves at t-1; 
moreover, the coefficient estimate of the interaction term between pre-crisis cash 
and the crisis dummy will be biased due to the endogeneity problem. In order to 
address the issue, we add lagged cash as an additional variable reflecting 
investment demand. 18  Pre-crisis cash reserves represent valuable information 
regarding a firm’s financial buffer prior to the crisis, though it is not greatly 
correlated with unexplained investment opportunities, i.e., after controlling for the 
lagged cash variables. Therefore, this will contribute to reducing the upward bias 
from the endogeneity problem. In order to show that our specification is in fact 
distant from the endogeneity issue, we compare the estimation results with a 
different order of lagged cash reserves. If the endogeneity problem is still evident 
in our specification, the results with a higher order of lagged cash will be much 
different. 
Second, in order to deal with the possible spurious correlation between pre-crisis 
cash and investment decline, we run the same analysis with samples from a 
financially stable period. If a significantly positive coefficient of the interaction 
term is observed from the financially stable period, the interpretation of the 
significantly positive relationship between pre-crisis cash and post-crisis 
investment given the existence of the negative supply-side effect will be misleading. 
Third, we examine whether firms which are financially more constrained 
experience higher investment declines, as expected from the negative supply-side 
effects. If the negative shock to the credit supply in fact matters during the crisis 
period, we would then find a greater influence (or greater sensitivity) of cash for 
financially constrained firms on investment. In order to do this, we mainly 
categorize small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as financially more constrained 
firms. Alternatively, we also use leverage, short-term debt, and stock market listing 
as alternative method of identifying firm’s financial constraint. 
Finally, we add recent firm-year observations to investigate whether the negative 
shock to external finance has any long-term effect on investment activity. Because 
our baseline model uses only two years (one pre- and one post-crisis observation 
for each firm) of observations, it is difficult to determine from our original sample 
whether the weak investment recovery thus far is related to supply-side effects. If 
the impact of the negative supply-side shock during the 2008 crisis still persists, 
then the estimated coefficient of interaction term between pre-crisis cash and time 
dummy for the recent years will also be significantly positive. On the other hand, if 
the negative effect is only short-lived, then the estimated coefficient of the 
                                          
18Duchin et al. (2010) did not include lagged cash in their specifications. However, they use cash reserves one 
year (or four quarters) prior to the crisis to address the endogeneity issue. In this case, the omission of lagged cash 
up to an order of three would produce downward bias, as their pre-crisis cash reserves show lags in four periods. 
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interaction term would be insignificant or negative. 
 
C. Results 
 
1. Corporate investment and pre-crisis cash reserve 
 
Table 5 presents the estimates of our baseline specification for cash reserves and 
corporate investment. We select the order of lagged cash reserves (or K in Equation 
(2)) as two years based on the information criteria19 and use cash reserves one 
year20 before the crisis (or 2007 cash) as pre-crisis cash. We also use capital 
productivity and cash flow as proxies for investment opportunities. 
The results in Table 5 show that yearly investment expenditures decreased 
significantly after the global financial crisis. The coefficient estimate in the 
regression of corporate investment on the crisis dummy (see column (1)) shows a 
significantly negative value, and it remains close to this significantly negative 
value even if controlling for investment opportunities (see columns (2) to (6)).  
TABLE 5—BASELINE RESULTS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
After -1.760*** -2.993*** -1.847*** -1.286*** -1.251*** -1.304*** 
(0.110) (0.151) (0.153) (0.161) (0.159) (0.158) 
After x Cash 0.107*** 0.0590*** 0.0375*** 0.0386*** 0.0372*** 
(0.00771) (0.00855) (0.00914) (0.00905) (0.00898) 
Cash (t-1) 0.144*** 0.165*** 0.161*** 0.156*** 
(0.0156) (0.0174) (0.0173) (0.0170) 
Cash (t-2) 0.0318** 0.0368** 0.0316** 
(0.0162) (0.0161) (0.0160) 
Capital productivity 0.235*** 0.253*** 
(0.0243) (0.0245) 
Cash flow -0.0729*** 
(0.0121) 
Constant 9.670*** 9.484*** 7.078*** 5.784*** 4.128*** 4.814*** 
(0.0550) (0.0489) (0.193) (0.323) (0.368) (0.377) 
N. Obs. 21,229 19,274 16,852 13,529 13,529 13,529 
R-squared 0.029 0.046 0.051 0.047 0.074 0.083 
N. Firms 12,614 10,659 9,897 7,796 7,796 7,796 
Notes: 1) ‘After’ is a dummy variable which is one for fiscal year 2008 and zero otherwise, ‘Cash’ is cash and cash 
equivalents over total assets during fiscal year 2004, ‘Capital productivity’ is the ratio of sales to tangible and 
intangible assets, and ‘Cash flow’ denotes operating income before depreciation and amortization over total assets. 
2) The numbers in parenthesis are the Huber-White standard errors clustered at the firm level. 3) ***, **, or * 
indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
 
This implies that the investment decline after the crisis is significant even after we 
control for demand-side effects, such as the decline in investment opportunities. 
The results in column (6) show that the yearly corporate investment expenditure of 
                                          
19The Akaike and Bayesian information criteria were calculated from the baseline specifications to obtain the 
optimal lag length. We also run an alternative specification without the crisis dummy or pre-crisis cash for a stable 
period (from 2004 to 2007) and find that the BIC will give the same lag length. 
20The selection of pre-crisis cash does not change the estimation results when τ ≥ crisis	year − K − 1 due to 
the two-stage least-squares argument; the residuals from the regression of D୲Cash୧,த of the lagged cash are 
unchanged. 
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assets on average for firms declined21 by 1.30%p following the global crisis period. 
This decline is 14.0% relative to the pre-crisis unconditional mean level of yearly 
investment expenditures of 9.28% (see Table 1). 
More importantly, we find evidence that the negative supply-side effect is 
significant on post-crisis investments. The coefficient of the interaction term 
between the crisis dummy and cash reserves is estimated to be significantly 
positive with regard to the regression of corporate investments on the crisis dummy 
and the interaction term (column (2)); it also retains a significantly positive value 
even after we control for investment opportunities (columns (5) and (6)). This 
result coincides with our prediction that the investment decline will be positively 
correlated with pre-crisis cash if the negative credit supply shock matters during 
the crisis period. For example, as the supply of credit was reduced significantly 
following the onset of the crisis, firms with large amounts of cash could cope with 
the negative credit supply shock using their internal funds, resulting in less of an 
investment decline (or a positive relationship between pre-crisis cash and post-
crisis investment). The empirical results show that the positive relationship 
between pre-crisis cash and investment remained even after controlling for 
investment demand, offering evidence that a significant portion of the investment 
decline was caused by the negative credit supply shock. From the result in column 
(6), a zero-cash firm suffered an investment decline of 1.30%p following the crisis, 
while for a mean-level (11.55%, see Table 4) cash firm, this value was 0.87%p; 
firms one standard deviation (12.77%) higher than the mean level cash firms saw 
an investment decline of only 0.39%p. A one-standard deviation increase in the 
cash balance softens the investment decline by 36.9% compared to the case of a 
zero-cash firm. Furthermore, cash reserves of 34.95% relative to total assets helped 
to eliminate the investment decline after the crisis, meaning that those who had the 
required cash balance to cancel out the investment decline perfectly was less than  
5% of all firms. 
 
2. Higher order lagged cash and financially stable periods 
 
In order to investigate the endogeneity issue, we also additionally provide the 
estimation results from the specification with lagged cash up to order four (K=4). If 
the endogeneity problem resides in our baseline specification, a change in of 
unexplained investment opportunities will show a strong have large correlation 
with the pre-crisis cash variable. In this case, not only will the estimate be is very 
different from our earlier results, but it will also it will vary in its magnitude and 
sign depending upon the lag length. 
The first four columns in Table 6 present the estimation results from the 
specification with a higher order of lagged cash reserves. First, it is important to 
note that the estimated coefficients of capital productivity and cash flow are very 
stable with regard to the choice of the lag length, implying that they are free from 
 
                                          
21Since we measure the corporate investment as the investment expenditure to total assets, the investment 
expenditure may increase in its level after the crisis which can be observed in non-financial firms’ fixed asset 
formation from national accounts. 
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TABLE 6—HIGHER ORDER LAGGED CASH AND CASH RESERVES THREE AND FIVE YEARS PRIOR 
Higher order lagged cash τ=2005 τ=2003 
After -1.832*** -1.304*** -1.209*** -1.173*** -1.304*** -1.154*** 
(0.150) (0.158) (0.170) (0.182) (0.158) (0.141) 
After x Cash 0.0587*** 0.0372*** 0.0386***    0.0397*** 0.0372*** 0.0341*** 
(0.00842) (0.00898) (0.00969) (0.0106) (0.00898) (0.00894) 
Cash (t-1) 0.134*** 0.156*** 0.154*** 0.153*** 0.193*** 0.182*** 
(0.0153) (0.0170) (0.0191) (0.0222) (0.0161) (0.0158) 
Cash (t-2) 0.0316** 0.0235 0.0150 0.0689*** 0.0516*** 
(0.0160) (0.0181) (0.0210) (0.0161) (0.0154) 
Cash (t-3) 0.00808 0.00457 
(0.0159) (0.0193) 
Cash (t-4) -0.0188 
(0.0167) 
Capital 
productivity 
0.264*** 
(0.0217) 
0.253*** 
(0.0245) 
0.231*** 
(0.0300) 
0.228***
(0.0340) 
0.253*** 
(0.0245) 
0.250*** 
(0.0244) 
 
Cash flow -0.0769*** -0.0729*** -0.0590***   -0.0597*** -0.0729*** -0.0728*** 
(0.0111) (0.0121) (0.0133) (0.0141) (0.0121) (0.0120) 
Constant 5.970*** 4.814*** 4.590*** 4.790*** 3.931*** 4.285*** 
(0.255) (0.377) (0.527) (0.722) (0.360) (0.350) 
N. Obs. 16,852 13,529 11,186 9,502 13,529 13,529 
R-squared 0.089 0.083 0.073 0.070 0.083 0.082 
N. Firms 9,897 7,796 6,344 5,310 7,796 7,796 
Notes: 1) ‘After’ is a dummy variable which is one for the fiscal year 2008 and zero otherwise, ‘Cash’ is cash and 
cash equivalents over total assets for fiscal years 2003 (5-yr), 2004 (4-yr), 2005 (3-yr), 2006 (2-yr), and 2007 (1-
yr), ‘Capital productivity’ is the ratio of sales to tangible and intangible assets, ‘Cash flow’ denotes operating 
income before depreciation and amortization over total assets, and ‘Cash (t-1)’ is one-period lagged cash and cash 
equivalents over total assets. 2) The numbers in parenthesis are the Huber-White standard errors clustered at the 
firm level. 3) ***, **, or * indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
4) The classifications of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and large firms are based on KIS data. 
the endogeneity issue. The estimates for the interaction term are approximately 
0.04 with lagged cash reserves of two years or more, and these values are all 
statistically significant. Specifically, they are not very different from the estimates 
with one and two years of lagged cash, as shown in Table 4-3, indicating that our 
baseline specification is not likely to be affected by the endogeneity problem 
caused by omitting the lagged cash variable. We also report the results from pre-
crisis cash reserves measured during fiscal years 2005 and 2003. On the same 
token, the estimation results will be very different if our proxy for pre-crisis cash is 
contaminated by the endogeneity problem. However, we note that the estimates of 
both the crisis dummy and the interaction term are very stable. This implies that the 
inclusion of lagged cash effectively removes any possible endogenous changes in 
cash reserves from pre-crisis cash. 
With regard to the identification problem, one may be concerned about whether 
the significant relationship between pre-crisis cash and investment decline is 
spurious or driven by a demand-side effect. If the significantly positive relationship 
between pre-crisis cash reserves and post-crisis investments is a general feature of 
the data, it would be misleading to interpret our results as evidence of the existence 
of a negative supply-side effect. However, if the significantly positive relationship 
is only observed in the sample during a financially turbulent period, not in a 
financially stable period, we may argue that the findings in the previous analysis 
imply the existence of an investment constraint due to the credit supply shock. 
In order to answer this question, we examine the coefficient estimate of the 
interaction term between cash reserves and the crisis dummy for 2000, for 2006 
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with placebo crises (stable periods), and during the 1998 currency crisis (a 
turbulent period). During stable periods, financial markets performed well; hence, 
investment expenditures by firms are less likely to be affected by the credit supply, 
resulting in a small or insignificant coefficient estimate of the interaction term. 
However, during the 1998 currency crisis, domestic banks underwent massive 
restructuring, and post-crisis investments by firms were more than likely 
constrained by the credit shortage. In that case, firms were forced to fund their 
investment via internal funds, implying that the coefficient estimate of the 
interaction term is significantly positive. We also provide estimation results for 
SMEs and for all firms because SMEs are considered to be more financially 
constrained. Thus, their reliance on internal funding will be more prevalent during 
this crisis period. 
Table 7 presents the estimation results for the financially stable and turbulent 
periods. First, we confirm that pre-crisis cash reserves did not affect investment 
expenditures during financially stable22 periods. The interaction terms between 
pre-crisis cash and the time dummy are estimated to be 0.017 and 0.010 for 2000 
and the 2006 placebo crisis, respectively, and they are both statistically 
insignificant. Although the estimates for the financially stable periods are in line 
with our expectations, but it is noteworthy that the estimates are small but positive, 
which implies that our findings are not as strong as those of Duchin et al. (2010).23 
TABLE 7—FINANCIALLY STABLE VS. TURBULENT PERIOD 
Crisis = Year 2000  Crisis = Year 2006   Crisis = Year 1998 
All SMEs All SMEs All SMEs 
After 0.379* 0.408 -0.541*** -0.553*** -2.474*** -2.285*** 
(0.221) (0.272) (0.178) (0.204) (0.224) (0.276) 
After x Cash 0.0171 -0.00276 0.0104 0.00232 0.0404** 0.0438** 
(0.0170) (0.0188) (0.0108) (0.0120) (0.0162) (0.0183) 
Cash (t-1) 0.0759** 0.124*** 0.158*** 0.174*** 0.118*** 0.113*** 
(0.0305) (0.0326) (0.0199) (0.0223) (0.0244) (0.0291) 
Cash (t-2) 0.0479** 0.0696*** 0.0614*** 0.0583*** 0.0321 -0.0140 
(0.0232) (0.0252) (0.0182) (0.0201) (0.0251) (0.0287) 
Capital productivity 0.223*** 0.266*** 0.285*** 0.311*** 0.145*** 0.161*** 
(0.0436) (0.0522) (0.0293) (0.0349) (0.0338) (0.0447) 
Cash flow -0.0240 -0.0348 -0.0667*** -0.0660*** -0.0384*** -0.0298 
(0.0236) (0.0258) (0.0141) (0.0147) (0.0148) (0.0199) 
Constant 4.367*** 3.802*** 4.489*** 4.552*** 4.943*** 5.065*** 
(0.554) (0.635) (0.410) (0.457) (0.472) (0.588) 
N. Obs. 6,058 4,406 11,997 10,021 5,900 4,249 
R-squared 0.046 0.057 0.066 0.069 0.120 0.104 
N. Firms 3,298 2,428 6,785 5,746 3,374 2,489 
Notes: 1) ‘After’ is a dummy variable which is one for the fiscal year 2008 and zero otherwise, ‘Cash’ is cash and 
cash equivalents over total assets during fiscal year 2004, ‘Capital productivity’ is the ratio of sales to tangible and 
intangible assets, and ‘Cash flow’ denotes operating income before depreciation and amortization over total assets. 
2) The numbers in parenthesis are the Huber-White standard errors clustered at the firm level. 3) ***, **, or * 
indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 4) The classifications of 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and large firms are based on KIS data. 
 
                                          
22Though the choice of financially stable periods (2000 and the 2006 placebo crises) is arbitrary, we find 
qualitatively similar results with alternative selections of placebo crises, except for the 1998 and 2008 crises. 
23Duchin et al. (2010) find the estimates of the interaction term during placebo crises to be negative in general; 
therefore, the significantly positive estimates of the interaction term can be interpreted as strong evidence of a 
supply-side effect. 
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With regard to the results for the 1998 currency crisis, we find that the estimated 
coefficients of the interaction terms for both all firms and SMEs are significantly 
positive, indicating that they experienced a shortage of credit supply following the 
currency crisis. All in all, the results from financially stable and turbulent periods 
suggest that our baseline specification can be used to identify negative supply-side 
effects. 
 
3. Financial constraint and the supply-side effect 
 
Financially constrained firms may suffer more from a negative shock to the 
credit supply during a global financial crisis period. Essentially, a financial 
constraint, which usually arises from information asymmetry, is known to amplify 
the negative impact on constrained firms, e.g., a greater decline in investment 
expenditures following the crisis in our case. Though there are several ways to 
identify financially more constrained firms,24 we use the classification as a small 
and medium enterprise (SME) for identifying financially more constrained firms. 
Together with the SME classification, we divide our sample into financially more 
and financially less constrained firms using alternative measures of financial 
constraint, in this case industry (three-digit) sales growth and ownership, and 
perform a similar analysis to test the robustness of our results. 
The first two columns in Table 8 show the estimation results of our baseline 
specification for large firms and SMEs. The coefficient estimate of the crisis 
TABLE 8—FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND POST-CRISIS INVESTMENT: ALTERNATIVE CLASSIFICATION 
  SME Category Industry Sales Growth Ownership 
No Yes High Low Public Private 
After -0.997*** -1.366*** -1.353*** -1.351*** -0.797*** -1.313*** 
(0.264) (0.183) (0.315) (0.297) (0.295) (0.188) 
After x Cash 0.0264* 0.0415*** 0.0243 0.0569*** 0.0262* 0.0326*** 
(0.0140) (0.0107) (0.0177) (0.0185) (0.0154) (0.0115) 
Cash (t-1) 0.0650*** 0.170*** 0.188*** 0.136*** 0.109*** 0.167*** 
(0.0252) (0.0197) (0.0384) (0.0321) (0.0330) (0.0217) 
Cash (t-2) 0.0435 0.0330* 0.0397 0.00998 0.0161 0.0493** 
(0.0271) (0.0186) (0.0313) (0.0290) (0.0310) (0.0199) 
Capital  
productivity 
0.148*** 
(0.0351) 
0.292***
(0.0301) 
0.314*** 
(0.0500) 
0.267***
(0.0535) 
0.156*** 
(0.0529) 
0.300*** 
(0.0280) 
Cash flow -0.0664** -0.0751*** -0.0850*** -0.0999*** -0.0522** -0.0646*** 
(0.0269) (0.0127) (0.0271) (0.0252) (0.0220) (0.0152) 
Constant 4.474*** 4.763*** 3.877*** 5.702*** 4.252*** 4.539*** 
(0.649) (0.437) (0.738) (0.721) (0.890) (0.442) 
N. Obs. 2,065 11,464 2,858 3,452 2,311 10,166 
R-squared 0.068 0.089 0.103 0.079 0.052 0.088 
N. Firms 1,130 6,723 1,429 1,726 1,274 6,039 
Note: 1) ‘Leverage’ is liabilities over the capital ratio, ‘Short-term Debt’ is current liabilities over the total 
liabilities ratio, ‘Stock listing’ refers to KOSPI-listed or KOSDAQ-listed (or registered) firms, and ‘Div. Payment’ 
denotes firms with non-zero dividend payments. 2) ‘After’ is a dummy variable which is one for the fiscal year 
2008 and zero otherwise, ‘Cash’ is cash and cash equivalents over total assets during fiscal year 2004, ‘Capital 
productivity’ is the ratio of sales to tangible and intangible assets, and ‘Cash flow’ denotes operating income 
before depreciation and amortization over total assets. 3) The numbers in parenthesis are the Huber-White standard 
errors clustered at the firm level. 4) ***, **, or * indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at 1%, 5%, or 
10% level, respectively. 
                                          
24For more details, refer to Kaplan and Zingles (1997) and Whited and Wu (2006), among others. 
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dummy is significantly negative for both large firms and SMEs. However, the post-
crisis investment decline is greater for SMEs. For instance, the coefficient estimate 
of the crisis dummy for large firms is -0.99, while the estimate for SMEs is -1.36. 
The coefficient estimates of the interaction term between cash and the crisis 
dummy are positive for both large firms and SMEs. However, we find that the 
estimate for large firms is less significant (with 10% level)25 while the estimate for 
SMEs is much higher and significant at the 1% level. These results provide 
evidence that SMEs, which are more financially constrained due to information 
asymmetry, can experience greater investment declines following the onset of a 
financial crisis. Moreover, the results coincide with our previous analysis (in 
Section 3), which showed that pre-crisis cash has more of an impact on post-crisis 
investment levels for SMEs. When compared to the results for all firms, shown in 
Table 5, we find that the estimate of the interaction term for SMEs is 0.041, which 
is close to the estimate for all firms (0.037), implying that the overall estimate is 
largely driven by the SMEs in the sample. Compared to firms with no cash, the 
average cash holdings for large firms can mitigate an investment decline by 
0.66%p, while the average cash holdings for SMEs can alleviate the decline by 
0.89%p, implying that cash is more valuable for SMEs. 
Table 7 (from column (3) to column (6)) presents the estimation results for 
financially more and less constrained firms by dividing the sample according to 
industry (three-digit) sales growth and ownership. We use industry sales growth 
one year prior to the crisis to capture the financial constraints and divide our 
sample into ‘high’ (above the third quantile) and ‘low’ (below the first quantile) 
groups. With regard to ownership, we classify KOSPI-listed, KOSDAQ-listed or 
registered firms as public firms, and others as private firms. 
We find that the role of cash in mitigating the investment decline is greater for 
financially more constrained firms. The coefficient estimate of the interaction term 
for firms with low industry sales growth is 0.056, which is around twice the 
coefficient estimate for firms in the group showing high industry sales growth 
(0.024). Private firms also show greater sensitivity to of investment expenditures 
on cash reserves than public firms. Overall, the results imply that the corporate 
investment decline following the 2008 crisis is largely related to the level of 
financial constraint of a firm, supporting the view that negative credit supply-side 
effects on corporate investments were evident during the crisis period. 
 
4. Why do corporate investments remain sluggish? 
 
Related to recent investment activity in corporate sector, we observe that private 
fixed capital formation (in current prices) remains sluggish after showing an 
increase due to the base effect following the fourth quarter of 2009. In order to 
examine the impact of external finance shocks on recent corporate investments, we 
                                          
25This result is robust even when (i) we include data from two and three years before and after the crisis in the 
sample, (ii) we include higher order lagged cash reserves as an explanatory variable, and (iii) we use Tobin’s q 
rather than capital productivity for listed firms. 
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add recent firm-year observations26 to our original sample. Next, we include an 
additional year dummy variable (‘further after’ crisis dummy) for the years from 
the first to the third year following the 2008 crisis, as well as an interaction term 
between pre-crisis cash and the ‘further after’ crisis dummy. If the credit crunch 
during the crisis has had a negative effect on corporate investments persistently, we 
would observe that the interaction term (between pre-crisis cash and the ‘further 
after’ crisis dummy) is significantly positive with the coefficient estimate for the 
‘further after’ crisis dummy being significantly negative. Meanwhile, if post-crisis 
investments are mainly affected by investment demand, such as depressed 
investment opportunities, we would find that the interaction term between the 
‘further after’ crisis dummy and pre-crisis cash reserves loses its significance. 
Table 9 shows the estimation results for our extended sample with large firms 
and SMEs. Interestingly, the ‘further after’ crisis dummy for SMEs is estimated to 
be significantly negative. Moreover, the estimated coefficient of the interaction 
term is significantly positive, implying that the more pre-crisis cash a firm has, the 
less its investment decreased during 2009-2011 compared to 2007. For large firms, 
the result is less suggestive for the supply-side effect on corporate investment; 
while the ‘further after’ crisis dummy has a negative coefficient, the estimated 
coefficient of the interaction term is not significant. 
In summary, the investment decline of SMEs after the crisis remains significant 
even if we include recent firm-year observations and is related to their levels of 
pre-crisis cash reserves. This indicates that the additionally depressed investments 
 
TABLE 9—LONG-TERM EFFECT OF A NEGATIVE SUPPLY SHOCK AND FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS 
Large firms SMEs 
After -0.876*** -0.893*** -0.898*** -1.364*** -1.368*** -1.376*** 
(0.266) (0.264) (0.264) (0.179) (0.177) (0.177) 
After x Cash 0.0270* 0.0270** 0.0262** 0.0445*** 0.0486*** 0.0480*** 
(0.0139) (0.0134) (0.0133) (0.00979) (0.00971) (0.00968) 
Further after -1.119*** -1.109*** -1.124*** -2.479*** -2.434*** -2.452*** 
(0.281) (0.281) (0.282) (0.179) (0.178) (0.178) 
Further after x Cash 0.0155 0.0152 0.0141 0.0684*** 0.0699*** 0.0691*** 
(0.0146) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.00965) (0.00980) (0.00980) 
Cash (t-1) 0.0737*** 0.0674*** 0.0676*** 0.156*** 0.143*** 0.143*** 
(0.0163) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.00933) (0.00920) (0.00921) 
Cash (t-2) 0.0519*** 0.0522*** 0.0521*** 0.0559*** 0.0556*** 0.0549*** 
(0.0140) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.00825) (0.00825) (0.00827) 
Capital productivity 0.0983*** 0.102*** 0.198*** 0.202*** 
(0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0151) (0.0155) 
Cash flow -0.0245* -0.0155 
(0.0149) (0.0105) 
Constant 5.135*** 4.412*** 4.640*** 6.538*** 5.400*** 5.542*** 
(0.267) (0.329) (0.351) (0.169) (0.195) (0.215) 
N. Obs. 6,287 6,287 6,287 28,746 28,746 28,746 
R-squared 0.031 0.044 0.045  0.043  0.060  0.061 
N. Firms 2,335 2,335 2,335  9,270  9,270  9,270 
Note: 1) ‘After’ is a dummy variable which is one for the fiscal year 2008 and zero otherwise, ‘Cash’ is cash and 
cash equivalents over total assets during fiscal year 2004, ‘Further after’ is a dummy variable which is one for 
fiscal years 2008-2011 and zero otherwise, ‘Capital productivity’ is the ratio of sales to tangible and intangible 
                                          
26Due to the time lag of financial statement disclosure, especially for unlisted small firms, the most recent 
financial statements which are up to date and which are consistent with our previous sample are for fiscal year 
2011. 
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assets, and ‘Cash flow’ denotes operating income before depreciation and amortization over total assets. 2) The 
numbers in parenthesis are the Huber-White standard errors clustered at the firm level. 4) ***, **, or * indicate 
that the coefficient estimate is significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
 
of SMEs after the crisis (from 2009 to 2011) are associated with the credit supply 
shock during the 2008 crisis and that the funding problem may have had a long-last 
negative impact on the investment activities of SMEs. However, we could not find 
any evidence that investment declines in large firms are related to a negative shock 
to their external finances, especially over the long term. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
We study whether the corporate investments of domestic firms, including small 
and medium enterprises, are affected by the negative shock to the credit supply 
which arose during the global financial crisis. Following Duchin et al. (2010), we 
use pre-crisis cash reserves (or internal funds) held by firms to identify any 
negative supply-side effect of the crisis, as cash reserves can play an important role 
as a financial buffer to an external funding shock. In order to address possible the 
endogeneity issue, we include lagged cash reserves in our baseline specifications. 
As a robustness check, we compare the results from the specification with higher 
order lagged cash reserves as well as the results from financially stable periods. 
From our baseline specification, we can summarize our empirical findings as 
follows. 
First, corporate investments (to the total asset ratio) significantly decreased 
following the onset of the global financial crisis, and the decline is found to be 
significant after controlling for investment demand. More importantly, we find that 
the investment decline is negatively related to pre-crisis cash reserves; the more 
cash a firm holds (or the greater the financial buffer), the less its post-crisis 
investment decline becomes in the data. The result implies that corporate 
investments are significantly affected by a negative shock to the external financing 
of a firm. 
Second, large firms experienced less of an investment decline following the 
crisis compared to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Because SMEs are more 
exposed to financial constraints, commonly driven by the problem of information 
asymmetry, a negative shock to the credit supply will have more of an impact on 
SMEs’ investments than it will on those of large firms. Our results indicate that 
there exists a strong relationship between pre-crisis cash held by SMEs and their 
post-crisis investments, implying that the negative supply-side effect is mostly 
driven by the SMEs in the sample. When using alternative measures of financial 
constraints, such as industry sales growth and ownership, we find that the results 
are qualitatively identical; our empirical evidence is supportive of the existence of 
a negative supply-side effect. 
Third, we find evidence that the recent investment depression from 2009 to 2011, 
mainly experienced by SMEs, is related to the negative shock to external funds 
during the crisis period. 
Our empirical findings support the view that the post-crisis investment decline is 
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driven by the negative credit supply shock during the crisis, especially affecting 
more financially constrained firms such as SMEs. However, it is necessary to 
investigate why the negative supply-side effect on investments still matters to 
SMEs, even four years after the crisis ended. Possible explanations would be a 
change in the financing behavior of SMEs (e.g., towards more conservative capital 
management) or an aggravated information asymmetry problem, leading to higher 
financial constraints, among others. We leave the question to future studies. 
 
REFERENCES 
Almeida, H., M. Campello, and M. Weisbach. 2004. “The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash.” 
Journal of Finance 59: 1777–1804.  
Arslan, O., C. Florackis, and A. Ozkan. 2006. “The Role of Cash Holdings in Reducing 
Investment-cash Flow Sensitivity: Evidence from a Financial Crisis in an Emerging  
Market.” Emerging Markets Review 7: 320–338.  
Bates, T., K. Kahle, and R. Stulz. 2009. “Why Do U.S. Firms Hold So Much More Cash than 
They Used to?” Journal of Finance 64: 1985–2021.  
Brunnermeier, M. K., T. M. Eisenbach, and Y. Sannikov. 2012. “Macroeconomics with 
Financial Frictions: A Survey.” NBER Working Paper 18102. 
Campello, M., J. R. Graham, and C. R. Harvey. 2010. “The Real Effects of Financial 
Constraints: Evidence from a Financial Crisis.” Journal of Financial Economics 97 (3): 470–
487. 
Dell’Ariccia, G., E. Detragiache, and R. Rajan. 2008. “The Real Effect of Banking Crises.” 
Journal of Financial Intermediation 17 (1): 89–112. 
Dittmar, A. and J. Mahrt-Smith. 2007. “Corporate Governance and the Value of Cash 
Holdings.” Journal of Financial Economics 83: 599–634.  
Duchin, R., O. Ozbas, and B. A. Sensoy. 2010. “Costly External Finance, Corporate 
Investment, and the Subprime Mortgage Credit Crisis.” Journal of Financial Economics 97 
(3): 418–435. 
Fazzari, S., R. Hubbard, and B. Petersen. 1988. “Finance Constraints and Corporate 
Investment.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1: 141–195.  
Gao, W., L. Ng, B. Zhang, and F. Zhu. 2012. “Information Asymmetry and Capital Structure 
around the World.” Working Paper. 
Gilchrist, S. and C. Himmelberg. 1999. “Investment: Fundamentals and Finance.” NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 1998, MIT Press. 
Hahm, J. and H. Kim. 2011. “Financial Sector Soundness and the Impact of External Shock.” 
In Korea’s Capacity to Cope with Crises in a Globalized Environment, edited by D. Cho and 
H. Kim, KDI Research Monograph 2011-03, Korea Development Institute. (in Korean) 
Harford, J., S. Mansi, and W. Maxwell. 2008. “Corporate Governance and Firm Cash 
Holdings in the US.” Journal of Financial Economics 87: 535–555.  
Holmstrom, B. and J. Tirole. 1997. “Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real 
Sector.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 663–691.  
Hoshi, T., A. Kashyup, and D. Scharfstein. 1991. “Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and 
Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
106: 33–60. 
Ivashina, V. and D. Scharfstein. 2010. “Bank Lending during the Financial Crisis of 2008.” 
Journal of Financial Economics 97 (3): 319–338. 
Jaffee, D. and T. Russell. 1976. “Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 90: 651–666.  
Kaplan, S. and L. Zingales. 1997. “Do Investment-cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful 
Measures of Financing Constraints?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 169–215.  
Kim, D. 2011. “Corporate Sector Soundness and Economic Crisis.” In Korea’s Capacity to Cope 
44 KDI Journal of Economic Policy  FEBRUARY 2015 
 
with Crises in a Globalized Environmentm, edited by D. Cho and H. Kim, KDI Research 
Monograph 2011-03, Korea Development Institute. (in Korean) 
Lee, H. 2005. “The Impacts of Uncertainty on Investment: Empirical Evidence from 
Manufacturing Firms in Korea.” KDI Journal of Economic Policy 27 (2): 89–116, Korea 
Development Institute. (in Korean). 
Lim, K. 2005. “An Analysis on Changes of Equipment Investment Patterns of Korean Firms 
Using Micro and Macro Data.” KDI Policy Study 2005-15, Korea Development Institute. (in 
Korean) 
Lim, K. and Y. Choi. 2006. “A Study on the Pattern Changes and Determinants of Corporate 
Cash Holding.” KDI Policy Study 2006-11, Korea Development Institute. (in Korean) 
Opler, T., L. Pinkowitz, R. Stulz, and R. Williamson. 1999. “The Determinants and 
Implications of Corporate Cash Holdings.” Journal of Financial Economics 52: 3–46.  
Pinkowitz, L., R. Stulz, and R. Williamson. 2006. “Does the Contribution of Corporate Cash 
Holdings and Dividends to firm Value Depend on Governance? A Cross-country Analysis.” 
Journal of Finance 61: 2725–2751. 
Stiglitz, J. and A. Weiss. 1981. “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information.” 
American Economic Review 71: 393–410.  
Whited, T. and G. Wu. 2006. “Financial Constraints Risk.” Review of Financial Studies 19: 
531–559. 
